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SEARCH AND SEIZURETHE NEW MEXICO ANNOUNCEMENT CASES

There are numerous American cases involving the power of the
police to enter private residences forcibly to execute search warrants.
The central issue in such cases is often that of resolving the obvious
conflict between the legitimate needs of law enforcement agencies
and the fourth amendment right of all householders to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The so-called announcement
rules attempt to reconcile these opposing interests by prescribing
certain procedures which the police must follow in the absence of
exceptional circumstances: in general, the police must announce
their presence and the object of their visit before they may forcibly
enter a residence to serve and execute a search warrant. Until recently the courts of New Mexico had not created a body of precedent dealing with the announcement issue.' This note will discuss
the development in New Mexico of the law in this area, with special
emphasis on its practical consequences to drug searches.
STATE v. SANCHEZ: THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The New Mexico Supreme Court and the New Mexico Court of
Appeals engaged in their most thorough treatment of the law of
2
forcible entry in State v. Sanchez. The facts of Sanchez are not
atypical among announcement cases. At approximately 10:15 a.m.,
four armed police officers approached the rear of Sanchez's apartment with a warrant to search for heroin. One officer knocked
loudly,3 and another called out "Police officers" to the people inside. No one came to the door, but the officers saw some movement
inside the apartment and heard the yell of a female and other noises.
1. State v. Baca, 87 N.M. 12, 528 P.2d 656 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 5,528 P.2d
649 (1974), was the first New Mexico case to lay down standards for forcible entry.
2. State v. Sanchez, 88 N.M. 378, 540 P.2d 858 (Ct. App.), rev'd, 88 N.M. 402, 540 P.2d
1291 (1975) [hereinafter the court of appeals decision will be cited as Sanchez I and the
supreme court opinion as Sanchez II].
3. There was conflicting evidence on this point. The court of appeals noted that the trier
of fact had found that the knock was loud and clearly audible to everyone inside the
apartment. Sanchez 1, 88 N.M. at 380, 540 P.2d at 860. However, one of the officers
testified that the knock was "not even as loud as a polite knock." Sanchez II, 88 N.M. at
404, 540 P.2d at 1293 (dissenting opinion).
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After waiting a few seconds, the officers entered the apartment
through a locked door, having been advised by an informant that
Sanchez would get rid of the heroin by flushing it down a toilet if
the officers did not act swiftly. 4 The officers found a woman and
two children in the kitchen; Sanchez was found in the bedroom
sitting at the foot of the bed. The bathroom, which was off the
kitchen area, was empty. While conducting their search, the officers
discovered a quantity of heroin in the top drawer of the dresser in
Sanchez's room.'
Sanchez was convicted in district court of unlawful possession of
heroin. 6 His argument on appeal was that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment because the manner in which the officers had entered violated
the guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure contained in
article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution7 and the
fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.8 The court of
appeals reversed Sanchez's conviction and ordered a new trial on the
ground that the officers' conduct had contravened the rule for police
entries which had been set out the year before in State v. Baca.9
Interpreting the "reasonableness" requirement of article II, section
10 of the New Mexico Constitution," ° the Baca court had concluded
that an officer with a search warrant' 1 must "give notice of authority and purpose and be denied admittance" prior to forcible entry.' '
The court had also qualified its rule by stating that noncompliance
with the general standard would be warranted when "exigent circumstances" exist:
4. Sanchez I, 88 N.M. at 380, 540 P.2d at 860.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. "The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and effects, from unreasonable searches ... "
8. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "
In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the Supreme Court held that the fourth
amendment also binds the states by incorporation into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Under the ruling of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), state courts, as
well as federal courts, must protect fourth amendment rights by excluding from evidence
the fruits of unconstitutional searches.
9. 87 N.M. 12, 528 P.2d 156 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 5, 528 P.2d 649 (1974).
In Baca the court of appeals ruled that the defendant's constitutional right of freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure was not violated when state and federal officers with a
warrant knocked several times on the defendant's door, announced loudly that they were
officers there for the purpose of serving a search warrant, waited between 3045 seconds
before entering, heard "some kind of commotion in the house," and finally kicked down
the door. Id., 87 N.M. at 13, 528 P.2d at 657.
10. See note 7 supra.
11. Dictum in Baca indicates that the Baca rule would also be applied to an officer
making an arrest on probable cause. State v. Baca, 87 N.M. at 14, 528 P.2d at 658.
12. Id. at 13,528 P.2dat657.
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Examples, but not a catalogue, of exigent circumstances are: (1)
when, prior to entry, officers in good faith believe that they or

someone within are in peril of bodily harm; or (2) when prior to
entry, officers in good faith believe that the person to be arrested is
fleeing or attempting to destroy evidence ....

The reasonableness of

upon its own facts and
each search and seizure is to be decided
13
circumstances .... (Citations omitted.)

4
Drawing on federal cases and the decisions of other states," the
court of appeals in Sanchez tried to expand and clarify some of the
crucial phrases of the Baca rule, such as "forcible entry," "notice of
authority and purpose," "denial of admittance," and "exigent circumstances." The court first determined that a "forcible entry" is
merely an "unannounced intrusion" into a residence.' 5 Forcible
entry occurs when the police actually break open a window or door
but may also occur when, as in the Sanchez situation, the police
enter a dwelling through an open door without having first obtained
1
permission to do so from the persons inside. 6
The court also stated that the officers had violated the "notice of
authority and purpose" provision of the Baca rule because, while
they had knocked and identified themselves as policemen, they had
failed to request permission to enter and to state their purpose for
being there before they walked into the apartment.' ' Nor, in the
court's view, were there any circumstances from which the officers
could have inferred that the defendant had denied them admission.
Such an inference is justified when the occupant is taking an unreasonable time to respond to the officer's knock or is engaged in
activities clearly inconsistent with an intention to open the door.
Since the time lapse in the present case was only a few seconds, the
court refused to conclude that the officers had been denied admittance.' 8
Finally, the court decided that the state had not demonstrated the
existence of any "exigent circumstances" which excused compliance
with the general rule. The state had argued that the officers had
formed a good faith belief before entering that the defendant was
attempting to escape or destroy evidence. One officer had testified
that in his experience an attempt is always made to get rid of narcotics before police can enter.' 9 The court responded to this argument by saying that there was no unusual noise that would support a
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 13-14, 528 P.2d at 657-658.
Sanchez I, 88 N.M. at 381-383, 540 P.2d at 861-863.
Id. at 381, 540 P.2d at 861.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381-382, 540 P.2d at 861-862.
Id. at 382, 540 P.2d at 862.
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reasonable belief that the defendant was about to destroy evidence
or flee. It made much of the fact that the police found the defendant
sitting serenely on the edge of his bed in his underwear and stated
that the general knowledge that narcotics are easily disposable
through plumbing systems will not create exigent circumstances unless coupled with evidence of an attempt to destroy the contraband
in the particular case. 2 0
On review, the New Mexico Supreme Court acknowledged State v.
Baca to be the proper statement of the New Mexico announcement
standard but reversed the court of appeals decision on a finding of
exigent circumstances. 2 I The court did not expressly accept the
court of appeals' definitions of "forcible entry," "notice of authority
and purpose," and "denial of admittance," but it apparently agreed
that the conduct of the officers did not conform to the general
announcement standard. The supreme court declared that exigent
circumstances and good faith belief in the existence of exigent circumstances are questions of fact which depend on practical considerations. Moreover, the exigency of a given set of circumstances is
to be evaluated from the viewpoint of a "prudent, cautious and
trained police officer." 2 2 The court found that the following factors
supported the officers' conclusion of exigent circumstances: (1) the
officers involved were not shown to be anything other than prudent
and cautious; (2) the officers had probable cause to believe that the
defendant had heroin in his home (presumably based on the same
facts and circumstances which enabled the finding of probable cause
necessary for the issuance of the search warrant); (3) experienced
officers, as these were, knew that there is ordinarily an attempt to
destroy heroin before the police enter; (4) an informant had told the
officers that the heroin would be flushed down the toilet if they did
not move quickly; and (5) the woman's scream and the moving
about of persons inside the apartment suggested that someone was
2
being alerted to do something. 3
THE ORIGINS OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT-BEFORE-ENTRY RULE
The Baca rule can trace its lineage back to a venerable commonlaw doctrine. 2 4 The classic statement of the rule appeared as dictum
20. Id. at 382-383, 540 P.2d at 862-863.
21. Sanchez II, 88 N.M. at 404, 540 P.2d at 1293.
22. Id. at 403, 540 P.2d at 1292.
23. Id. at 404, 540 P.2d at 1293.
24. For a history of announcement requirements, see Blakey, The Rule of Announce.
ment and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev.
499, 500-508 (1964).
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a case which actually involved the execution of

In all cases where the King is party, the sheriff (if the doors be not
open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to do
other execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter.
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming,
and to make request to open the doors. 2 6
The Semayne notice requirement has been widely applied by American courts in regard to both searches and arrests.2 7 Furthermore,

since the turn of the century, the federal government 2 8 and many

states have embodied the common-law principles in statutes relating
to the execution of search warrants. 2 9 The purpose of these statutes
and judicially-developed rules of announcement has been variously
stated: they protect the privacy of householders by requiring officers

to make a request to enter;3

0

they also safeguard the officers, who

might otherwise be mistaken for prowlers and attacked by the occupants of the house.3

While most statutes prescribing announcement are absolute on
their faces, state courts have recognized certain exceptions to the
notice requirement.2

In Ker v. California,3"

the United States

Supreme Court considered the constitutional dimensions of announcement statutes and their judicial exceptions. This case involved
a California statute which required an arresting officer before entering a house to demand admittance and explain the purpose for which
admittance was desired.3 4 A series of California cases had authorized
noncompliance with the rule when exigent circumstances, such as the
25. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
26. Id. at 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195.
27. See, e.g., State v. Dudgeon, 13 Ariz. App. 464, 477 P.2d 750 (1970); State v.
Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 P. 1104 (1917). For a brief treatment of the American case law,
see Blakey, supra note 24, at 504-509.
28. The federal act, 18 U.S.C. §3109 (1970), popularly known as the Search Warrant
Act, provides that:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of the warrant.
29. For an analysis of the state knock-and-announce statutes, see Blakey, supra note 24;
Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Non-Sense, An Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 St.
John's L. Rev. 626 (1970).
30. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1958).
31. Id. at 313.
32. See Note, No-Knock and the Constitution: The District of Columbia Reform and
CriminalProcedureAct of1970, 55 Minn. L. Rev. 871, 876-881 (1971).
33. 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (5-4 decision).
34. Cal. Penal Code §844 (West 1969).
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imminent destruction of the contraband, exist. In Ker, police officers
watched a suspect as he made an apparent purchase of marijuana and
drove away. The officers followed but lost the suspect when he made
a sudden U-turn in the middle of a block. They found his apartment
by tracing his license number and gained entry noiselessly with a
passkey obtained from the building manager. They did not demand
admittance or notify Ker of their authority and purpose before
entering. The Court found that the officers' entry was within the
destruction of the evidence exception to the general announcement
rule because the officers believed that the defendant was in possession of narcotics, an easily disposable substance. Moreover, the
defendant's furtive conduct before arrest (the U-turn) was ground for
the belief that he was expecting the police. The Court held that
under these circumstances entering without notice did not offend the
fourth amendment reasonableness standard.' I
The United States Supreme Court has not had occasion to hold
that any other exception to a general notice rule is constitutionally
acceptable. However, in Miller v. United States,3 6 a pre-Ker decision,
the Court recognized with approval an entire list of state-created
exceptions to notice rules even though it was not deciding an issue of
exigent circumstances. 3 7 The Miller list of exigent circumstances is
identical to that which the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted in
State v. Baca.38
THE "BLANKET" EXCEPTION TO ANNOUNCEMENT
Thus far, all the New Mexico cases which have ruled on the announcement issue have involved searches for narcotics. In three of
the four current decisions, the destruction of the evidence exception
was applied to excuse announcement. 3 I In the fourth case, the fleeing defendant exception was applied.4"
The disagreement in Sanchez between the supreme court and the
court of appeals over the type of facts necessary to make out an
instance of exigent circumstances reflects a similar split in the authorities on the manner of applying the destruction of the evidence
exception in drug cases. The so-called "blanket rule" states that exi35. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 40.
36. 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). In Miller the court was determining how the District of
Columbia's judicially-created announcement rule applied to a warrantless arrest.
37. Id. at 309. See also Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
38. State v. Baca, 87 N.M. at 14, 528 P.2d at 658.
39. In addition to Baca and Sanchez, the destruction of the evidence exception was
applied in State v. Anaya, 89 N.M. 302, 551 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1976).
40. State v. Kenard, 88 N.M. 107, 537 P.2d 1003 (Ct. App. 1975).
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gent circumstances are always present in searches for narcotics because narcotics are easily disposed of.4 One commentator suggests
that with the development of indoor plumbing, the rules derived
from Semayne's Case have become anachronistic and unduly hamper
the police. 4 2 Under the other view of exigent circumstances, more
than the readily destructible nature of the contraband must be
shown to excuse an entry without announcement. The officers must
become aware of exigent circumstances at the time they arrive for
the search; particular information, such as activity within the house,
must reasonably lead to the conclusion that the occupants are preparing to destroy evidence.4 3
In Sanchez, the court of appeals expressly rejected a blanket exception to announcement: "Exigent circumstances do not exist
where the only fact known to the police is the readily disposable
nature of the contraband that is the object of the search." 4 4 The
supreme court opinion, on the other hand, strongly suggests that it
was applying a blanket rule. The supreme court curiously cited cases
both advocating and repudiating a blanket rule to support its decision, but it emphasized that the exigency of circumstances is to be
judged by "practical circumstances." 4 I It stated that the foremost of
these practical considerations is the experience of a prudent, trained
officer who knows that narcotics suspects ordinarily try to jettison
the evidence before the police can seize it. It is true that the court
noted some particular facts (the woman's scream and the other noise
within) which would be necessary to a finding of exigent circumstances under a nonblanket rule,4 6 but it nowhere indicated that
particular facts were required in all cases to excuse compliance with
the announcement rule. The court also relied on the informant's
statement that Sanchez would destroy the evidence to justify the
entrance into Sanchez's apartment. Under a nonblanket rule, the
statements of an informant cannot create exigent circumstances; exigent circumstances must be perceived by the officers at the time they
appear to execute the search warrant. 4
41. People v. Arnold, 186 Colo. 372, 527 P.2d 806 (1974). For a history of California's
adoption and subsequent repudiation of a blanket rule, see Note, Announcement in Police
Entries, 80 Yale L.J. 139, 160-162 (1970).
42. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the CriminalLaw, 49 Calif. L. Rev.
474, 502 (1961).
43. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 62-63 (separate opinion of Justice Brennan); Heaton v.
Commonwealth, 215 Va. 137, 207 S.E.2d 829 (1974); People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586,
432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967).
44. Sanchez 1, 88 N.M. at 383, 540 P.2d at 863.
45. Sanchez II, 88 N.M. at 403, 540 P.2d at 1292.
46. Id. at 404, 540 P.2d at 1293.
47. See cases cited note 43 supra.
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State v. Anaya,4 8 a court of appeals case decided after Sanchez, is
an even stronger indication than the Sanchez supreme court decision
that New Mexico has adopted a blanket rule. In Anaya officers
armed with a search 'warrant crawled stealthily under the defendant's
trailer at approximately 6:30 a.m. and sawed through the sewer pipe
leading from the bathrooms in order to recover any narcotics which
might be flushed away. Only after the severing of the sewer pipe did
any of the officers knock and identify themselves at the front door
of the trailer.4" The court conceded that entry into the crawl space
was an unannounced intrusion which violated the Baca standard, but
it found with almost no discussion that the intrusion was justified by
exigent circumstances. There was no testimony that the officers had
perceived any particular facts that would tend to establish that
Anaya was contemplating the destruction of the evidence before
they entered into the crawl space. The court relied solely on testimony that heroin is generally disposed of by flushing it down a toilet
and the testimony of an officer in the search party who said that he
had prevented the defendant from disposing of evidence in this manner during an arrest on a prior narcotics charge.' 0
CONCLUSION

If, as State v. Anaya and the Sanchez supreme court decision seem
to indicate, the New Mexico courts have adopted a blanket exception
to announcement in all cases involving drug searches, they have provided the police with a formidable tool. In Sanchez the court of
appeals was deeply concerned with the possibility of abusing such a
tool and conjured up pictures of local officers battering down doors
like totalitarian police. Another concern elicited by a blanket rule is
that it undermines the accused's presumption of innocence by assuming that, if the officer first makes known his presence and demands
admittance, the suspect will refuse to admit him and attempt to
destroy any incriminating evidence in his possession. 1
Given the dearth of United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the exceptions to announcement rules, it is unclear whether a
blanket rule is constitutionally permissible. The Ker decision 2 can
arguably be read to support either a blanket or non-blanket view of
the destruction of the evidence exception.' ' Justice Clark's majority
48. 89 N.M. 302, 551 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1976).
49. Id. at 303, 551 P.2d at 993.
50. Id.
51. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 56.
52. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
53. People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1967), takes the
view that the Ker majority did not authorize unannounced entries by a blanket rule based
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opinion in Ker stated that the unannounced entry into Ker's apartment was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment but noted
both the easily destructible nature of the evidence and Ker's apparent effort to elude the police while he was driving to his apartment. 4 It can be argued that Ker rejects a blanket rule if Ker's
attempt to elude the police is viewed as enough particular information to have reasonably raised the inference in the officers' minds
that Ker was expecting them at his apartment and was therefore
preparing to destroy the evidence. The alternate argument is that,
even granting that Ker was expecting an imminent visit from the
police, the officers did not see or hear any particular activity within
the apartment which indicated that Ker was actually attempting to
destroy the evidence. The police merely assumed that Ker would
destroy the evidence on the basis of their experience with other
narcotics offenders. Regardless of the objections to a blanket rule,
New Mexico courts can apparently feel free to administer a blanket
exception to announcement until the Supreme Court dispels the
ambiguity created by Ker.
CAROL A. BACA

on the nature of the crime or contraband involved. For the opposite view, see Note,
Announcement in Police Entries, supra note 41, at 160.
54. 374 U.S. at 40.

